



SECOND CIRCUIT AND NEW YORK COURTS SPLIT ON
WHETHER VENUE PROVISION OF LOUISIANA
STATUTE AUTHORIZING DIRECT ACTION AGAINST
INSURERS LIMITS ENFORCEMENT OF STATUTE
TO LOUISIANA
A Louisiana statute provides that an "injured person . .. at [his]
option, shall have a right of direct action against [an alleged tortfeasor's]
insurer . . . in the parish where the accident or injury occurred or in
the parish where the insured has his domicile.. " 1 Pursuant to this
provision, a New York resident, injured in an automobile accident in
Louisiana, sued the driver's insurer directly in a New York state court.
The Appellate Division, reversing the lower court's dismissal of a motion
for summary judgment,2 held that the substantive right granted by the
statute was limited by its venue provisions to actions brought in the proper
parish in Louisiana.3 Morton v. Maryland Cas. Co., 1 App. Div. 2d 116,
148 N.Y.S.2d 524 (2d Dep't 1955). On similar facts, the Second
Circuit reversed a district court dismissal, 4 holding that the venue provisions
of the Louisiana statute were "but requirements of place of suit which do
1. LA. RPv. STAT. § 22: 655 (1950): "The injured person or his or her heirs, at
their option, shall have a right of direct action against the insurer within the terms
and limits of the policy in the parish where the accident or injury occurred or in the
parish where the insured has his domicile, and said action may be brought against the
insurer alone or against both the insured and the insurer, jointly and in solido. This
right of direct action shall exist whether the policy of insurance sued upon was writ-
ten or delivered in the State of Louisiana or not and whether or not such policy con-
tains a provision forbidding such direct action, provided the accident or injury occurred
within the State of Louisiana. Nothing contained in this Section shall be construed
to affect the provisions of the policy or contract if the same are not in violation of
the laws of this state. It is the intent of this Section that any action brought hereunder
shall be subject to all the lawful conditions of the policy or contract and the defenses
which could be urged by the insurer to a direct action brought by the insured, pro-
vided the terms and conditions of such policy or contract are not in violation of the
laws of this state."
2. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied below on the ground
that the interpretation and applicability of the statutes and common law of Louisiana
are factual matters which should be established upon a trial.
3. The court also determined the enforcement of the statute to be contrary to
New York public policy. 1 App. Div. 2d at 120, 148 N.Y.S.2d at 527. See note 10
infra.
4. The district court had dismissed on the grounds of forum non conveniens.
Collins v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 128 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The
instant case held the proper procedure on such a finding to be transfer to Louisiana;
the instant court also questioned the validity of finding forum non conveniens merely
on the grounds of congested dockets. See generally GoomDIcH, CONrLICT o4 LAws 22
(3d ed. 1949).
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not carry beyond the limits of a Louisiana forum." - Collins v. American
Automobile Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1956).
A state-created right 6 may be qualified by the state so that it can be
enforced in that state only in the manner or before the tribunal designated.7
Such modifications are usually treated as "procedural" and hence not bind-
ing on foreign courts,8 but if the right and its procedural qualification are
found to be "inseparable" foreign courts regard the right as enforceable
only as qualified,9 and then only if the claim is not contrary to the public
policy of the forum.'0 Whether a right and a remedy are inseparable for
this purpose may be a question of construction to determine if the legislature
intended the remedy to "accompan[y] the obligation everywhere." 11 The
fact that the limitation on the right is contained in the same section 12 or
statute 13 creating the right has been held to show that the two were in-
tended to be united; even a provision in a separate statute, if sufficiently
specific, may modify the right. Construction is not always determinative,
however, for foreign courts sometimes refuse to recognize procedural limita-
tions on the ground that the state creating the right had no power to bind
them as to remedy.14 In some cases, an influential factor appears to have
been that unless the remedy accompanied the right, plaintiffs instituting
actions in foreign forums would have advantages over those suing in the
forum where the right was created. Thus, rights and remedies were held
inseparable where a statute making shareholders liable for the debts of a
corporation had a special statute of limitations shorter than that of the
foreign forum,15 and also where such a statute provided that creditors, to
5. 230 F.2d at 423. The court also determined that New York public policy did
not compel dismissal. Id. at 420. See note 10 infra.
6. The supreme courts of both the United States and Louisiana have determined
that the direct action statute confers a "substantive right." Lumberman's Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954) ; West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d
122 (1950).
7. Pollard v. Bailey, 87 U.S. 520 (1874) ; Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904).
8. A distinction is made by the courts between those matters which relate to sub-
stance, sometimes called matters of right, and those which relate to procedure, or
matters of remedy. The latter are governed by the internal law of the forum, regard-
less of where the transaction occurred out of which the claim now in litigation arose.
GoonRicH, CONFLICT or LAWs 226 (3d ed. 1949).
9. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451 (1904).
10. See Goonitic, CONLICT Or LAWS §§ 11, 97 (3d ed. 1949); STuMESRG, CON-
FLICT or LAws 168 (2d ed. 1951); Notes, 57 CoLum. L. Rxv. 256 (1957), 25 FORDHA,
L. REV. 333 (1956). See also Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 316 Mich. 37,
24 N.W.2d 547 (1946); Kertson v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 242 N.W. 329 (1932).
Compare Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co., 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316 (1938), with Mc-
Arthur v. Maryland Cas. Co., 184 Miss. 663, 186 So. 305 (1939).
11. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904).
12. Pollard v. Bailey, 87 U.S. 520, 525 (1874). But see Galveston Ry. v. Wallace,
223 U.S. 481, 490 (1912).
13. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904).
14. See, e.g., Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914);
Galveston Ry. v. Wallace, 223 U.S. 481 (1912) ; Fresquez v. Farnsworth & Chambers
Co., 238 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1956).
15. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451 (1904).
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enforce the stockholders' liability, must first get a judgment against the
corporation and a return nulla bona or else proceed directly against the
shareholder in equity.16 Similarly, foreign courts have enforced together
wrongful death statutes and accompanying special measures of damages.
17
Where the right is enforceable in the originating state's courts of general
jurisdiction, and the procedural modification is designed to limit venue
to that state, foreign courts have not considered themselves bound by the
modification.' But foreign courts have respected provisions limiting
enforcement of a statutory right to a specially-created tribunal, such as a
workmen's compensation board.19 In Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v.
George,20 where an injured employee sued his employer in Georgia under
an Alabama liability statute which purported to restrict venue to a "court of
competent jurisdiction within the state of Alabama, and not elsewhere,"
the Supreme Court held Alabama without power "to create a transitory
cause of action and at the same time destroy the right to sue on that
transitory cause of action in any court having jurisdiction." 2' A different
result was achieved, however, in Davis v. Harris & Ca.22 where, under an
Alaska workmen's compensation statute giving the Alaska territorial courts
exclusive jurisdiction if the employer could be served in Alaska, an
employee sued an Alaskan employer in the state of Washington to recover
for an accident occurring in Alaska. The Supreme Court of Washington
distinguished Tennessee Coal on the ground that the Alaska statute enabled
plaintiff to sue elsewhere should he be unable to serve defendant in Alaska,
and plaintiff also retained his common-law rights. Hence, service on
defendant being obtainable in Alaska, plaintiff's right was enforceable only
in Alaska. In the Collins case, the Second Circuit, finding the Louisiana
statute's right of direct action against the insurer separable from its re-
strictive venue provisions, relied on Tennessee Coal in holding the right
enforceable outside Louisiana.s2 The New York court reached a contrary
16. National Bank v. Francklyn, 120 U.S. 747 (1887). See also Fowler v. Lam-
son, 146 Ill. 472, 34 N.E. 932 (1893).
17. Northern Pac. R.R. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190 (1894); see Texas & Pac. Ry.
v. Cox, 145 U.S. 593 (1892) (district court sitting in Texas enforced Louisiana
wrongful death statute); cf. Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904)
(method of computing damages for a wrongful death action granted by Mexican law
so dissimilar to Texas statute as not to permit a suit in federal court in Texas).
18. E.g., Fresquez v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 238 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1956);
see Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 355 (1914); GooDRIcH,
CoNPLIcT ov LAws 272 (3d ed. 1949). See also Stewart v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,
168 U.S. 445 (1897).
19. Decker v. Spicer Mfg. Div., 101 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Ohio 1951); Snook v.
Industrial Comm'n, 9 F. Supp. 26 (E.D. Ill. 1934); Elsas v. Montgomery Elevator
Co., 38 F.2d 303 (W.D. Mo. 1930).
20. 233 U.S. 354 (1914).
21. Id. at 360.
22. 25 Wash. 2d 664, 171 P.2d 1016 (1946).
23. The Collins court stated that Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S.
48 (1954) logically requires a decision that the venue provision does not prohibit ex-
tra-territorial enforcement. 230 F.2d at 423. It does not necessarily follow from Lum-
berman's Mutual's determination that the right is "substantive" for purposes of fed-
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conclusion in Morton, treating the problem as merely one of construction
and distinguishing Tennessee Coal as holding only that the Alabama
legislature did not intend to limit venue to that state.
Although the New York construction was probably justified, inasmuch
as the statutory right and its modification are contained not only in the
same section of the statute but also in the same sentence, 24 an inquiry which
considers only construction is clearly inadequate.2 At the same time, the
Second Circuit's reliance on Tennessee Coal is questionable. In that case,
for a foreign court to give effect to the restrictive venue provision would
have completely foreclosed plaintiff from pursuing his claim outside
Alabama even were defendant unavailable for service in Alabama.28  In
the instant cases, limiting venue for direct actions to Louisiana would not
deprive plaintiff of his basic common-law remedy against the tortfeasor,
enforceable wherever service could be obtained. The instant cases are
more closely analogous to the Davis situation, where plaintiff had an
available common-law remedy but attempted instead to impose statutory
liability without fault, contending that the Alaska venue provision was in-
applicable. Similarly, the Louisiana direct action statute creates new
liabilities for insurers. The statute does not permit the insurer to avoid
liability by raising defenses which at common law would be good against
the insured,2 T and further broadens the insurer's liability by foreclosing
certain defenses which the insured might have against plaintiff.28 By
the reasoning of the Davis case, for plaintiff to enforce a right thus modify-
ing the common law he must follow the statute meticulously, including its
venue provisions. But despite Davis, mere statutory alterations of the
common law have been insufficient to justify exclusive venue. 29  Rather,
the courts have required the existence of peculiar factors such as a special
tribunal8 0 or unique procedures 8 l not present in the instant cases. It
would seem, therefore, that the right of direct action should be treated as
separable from the venue provisions, thus allowing the right to be enforced
outside of Louisiana. Such a result does not appear to impose an unrea-
eral diversity that a foreign court must enforce the statute. "[A] federal court adjudi-
cating a state-created right solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties
is for that purpose, in effect, only another court of the State .... ." Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
24. See text and citation at note 12 supra.
25. See cases cited note 14 supra.
26. 233 U.S. at 359.
27. West v. Monroe Bakery, Inc., 217 La. 190, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950); see
Jackson v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 211 La. 19, 29 So. 2d 177 (1946)
(dictum).
28. E.g., Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935) (spouse
not precluded from recovery for negligence of co-spouse); Rome v. London & Lan-
cashire Indemnity Co., 169 So. 132 (La. Ct. App. 1936) (governmental immunity).
See exhaustive annotation in Harvey v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 6 So. 2d 774 (La.
Ct. App. 1942).
29. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 360 (1914).
30. See cases cited note 19 supra.
31. See cases cited notes 15 and 16 supra.
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sonable burden on insurance companies, for insurers as defendants will be
subject to no hazards not ordinarily encountered by defendants in suits on
transitory claims. The chief objection to the direct action is the fact that it
automatically informs jurors that the alleged tortfeasor is insured; juries
with this knowledge, it is believed, will tend to disregard the basic issue of
the alleged tortfeasor's fault and, in addition, award larger recoveries.
8 2
Most states take extreme care to conceal from juries any knowledge of
defendant's insurance status, even declaring mistrials when the information
leaks out.P This may provide a valid objection on public policy grounds
to enforcement of direct claims in such states, but since state policies vary
on the question, 4 it would seem undesirable to develop a rule of conflicts
which precludes all foreign courts from entertaining direct actions under
the Louisiana statute. A better solution is to have direct actions enforce-
able everywhere, subject to the usual qualification that a state need not
recognize claims that are contrary to its public policy.35
Courts-
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS RULE OF
COURT FORBIDDING PHOTOGRAPHING OF
PRISONERS IN JAIL OR ON WAY TO
AND FROM COURTROOM
Defendant newspaper photographers took pictures of a convicted
murderer in the lobby of the courthouse after sentence had been imposed.
No one was aware that the photographs had been taken until they were
published.1 Defendants were convicted of contempt of court for violating
a rule of court 2 which prohibited the photographing of any prisoner in
32. Lassiter, Direct Actions . . . Against the Insurer, 1949 INs. L.J. 411; KAL-
V=N, REPORT ON THE JURY PROJECT O THE UNIVERSITY OP CHICAGO LAW ScHooL 22-
25 (text of speech delivered at Ann Arbor, Michigan, Nov. 5, 1955, on file in Biddle
Law Library); Note, 31 IND. L.J. 75, 77 (1955); see Morton, 1 App. Div. 2d at
124, 148 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
33. E.g., Carls Markets, Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1953) ; Cosselmon v.
Dunfee, 172 N.Y. 507, 65 N.E. 494 (1902); Leishman v. Taylor, 199 Ore. 546,
263 P.2d 605 (1953); cf. Ideal Pure Milk Co. v. Whitaker, 243 S.W.2d 479 (Ky.
1951).
34. Compare Kertson v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 242 N.W. 329 (1932) and Bur-
kett v. Globe Indemnity Co., 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316 (1938), with Lieberthal v.
Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 316 Mich. 37, 24 N.W.2d 547 (1946) and McArthur v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 184 Miss. 663, 186 So. 305 (1939). Failure to refuse enforcement
on the public policy theory does not necessarily manifest approval of the action. See
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918).
35. See note 10 supra.
1. Instant case at 285-86, 126 A.2d at 696 (dissenting opinion). See note 8 infra.
2. WESTMORELAND COUNTY CT. RULE 6084 provides: "(a) No pictures or photo-
graphs shall be taken, immediately preceding or during sessions of this court or re-
cesses between sessions, in any of the court rooms or at any place in the court house
1957]
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the jail or on the way to or from a session of court. Defendants appealed,
alleging that the rule unconstitutionally invaded the freedom of the press.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, 3 upholding the rule on the
ground that since a prisoner is the involuntary subject of court restraint, the
court has a duty to protect him from invasions of privacy.4 Mack Appeal,
386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957).
A court of record has authority to make rules for the fair and
expedient administration of justice. 5 Such rules are designed to prescribe
both procedural devices and standards of conduct within the courtroom
and in adjacent areas close enough to affect the court's proceedings.
6
Rules of court prohibiting the taking of photographs have been sustained
on the ground of insuring the dignity and decorum of the courtroom.7 The
rule in the instant case, prohibiting photographing of prisoners in jail
or on trips to and from the courtroom, cannot be justified on this basis,
however, because it purports to govern conduct which has no effect on the
decorum of the proceedings.8 The court's rationalization for the rule, that
within forty feet of the entrance to any court room. (b) No court proceeding shall
be broadcast or televised. (c) No pictures or photographs of any party to a civil or
criminal action, juror or witness, shall be taken in the Law Library or in any office or
other room of the court house, except with the knowledge and consent of the person
or persons photographed. (d) No prisoner or inmate of the county jail shall be
photographed in the jail or on his way to or from a session of court." See instant case
at 253-54, 126 A.2d at 680.
3. Other defendants took pictures outside the entrance to the courtroom. This was
in violation of part (a) of the rule, which is more easily sustained on the ground that
it protects the dignity and decorum of the courtroom. The scope of this Comment is
limited to those convictions based on part (d) of the rule.
4. Bell, J. concurred in part, voting to uphold convictions under part (a) of the
rule on the ground of protecting the dignity and decorum of the court, and dissented
in part, voting to reverse convictions under part (d). Musmanno, J. dissented, declaring
the entire rule invalid.
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 61, 62 (Purdon Supp. 1956). A rule of court cannot
change existing substantive law. Carroll v. Quaker City Cabs, Inc., 308 Pa. 345, 162
Atl. 258 (1932) ; Equipment Corp. v. Primos Vanadium Co., 285 Pa. 432, 132 Atl. 360
(1926). Nor would it seem that a rule of court can exceed a court's power to enforce
it. A court's primary sanction is the contempt power. In Pennsylvania contempt may
be used to punish misbehavior within and outside the courtroom which tends to obstruct
the administration of justice. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2041 (III) (Purdon 1930) ;
see Greason v. Cumberland Ry., 54 Pa. Super. 595 (1913) ; cf. Snyder's Case, 301 Pa.
276, 152 Atl. 33 (1930).
6. See, e.g., PA. R. Civ. P. 223.
7. People v. Ulrich, 376 Ill. 461, 34 N.E.2d 393 (1941) ; Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md.
114, 136 Atl. 312 (1927) ; State v. Clifford, 162 Ohio St. 370, 118 N.E.2d 853 (1954),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 929 (1955).
A.B.A. CANONS JUDICIAL ETHIcs 35 states: "Proceedings in court should be con-
ducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The taking of photographs in the courtroom
[is] . . . calculated to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings . . . and
should not be permitted." See Brand, Canons and Court Rules on Courtroom Publicity,
37 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 149 (1954), for a collection of states having similar rules. For
a general discussion of canon 35, see Panel Discussion, Fair Trial and Freedom of the
Press, 19 F.R.D. 16 (1956) ; Hanson, Canon 35-Press, Radio and Television Coverage
of the Courts, 16 ALA. LAW 248 (1955). But see In re Hearings Concerning Canon
35, 296 P.2d 465 (Colo. 1956), which holds that with modern photographic techniques
and pooling arrangements among newspapers the decorum argument can no longer
sustain rules prohibiting the taking of photographs within the courtroom.
8. See text at note 1 supra. See also In the Matter of Seed, 140 Misc. 681, 251
N.Y. Supp. 615 (Sup. Ct. 1931). A newspaper photographer was convicted of contempt
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the prisoner had a right of privacy which he was unable personally to
protect and which hence fell on the court to protect,9 is unique.
Since the instant rule of court is by its terms directed at photograph-
ing,'0 not photographing and publishing, it would appear that the rule was
not drafted to protect individual rights, but rather to police the conduct of
proceedings. Any harm to the individual would arise not from the mere
taking of the picture but from its being made public.-" Nevertheless, as-
suming the rule was intended to safeguard individuals, it is questionable
whether individuals in the circumstances enumerated by the rule have a
legally enforceable interest in not having their pictures taken or published.
Jurisdictions recognizing a right of privacy 2 uniformly refuse to extend
it to one identified, willingly or not, with an event of public interest.13
The instant court conceded that the prisoner had "become a 'public
figure',"1 4 yet found that the trial court was charged with a duty to
protect his right of privacy because the prisoner himself was "powerless
to do so by any means within his control." 15 Interpretation of this decision
as recognizing in the prisoner a right of privacy enforceable at law would
clearly extend present law. However, the court may consider the prisoner
to have a right of privacy which, though not supporting a damage remedy
at law because of his public status, is nevertheless deserving of preventive
protection by a rule of court enforced through the contempt power because
for taking flashbulb pictures in the corridor outside the courtroom, causing an explosion
and a disturbance. The court stated, "Nothing herein is intended to indicate that this
court has a viewpoint that pictures may not be taken in the corridors of the courthouse.
The press has a right to collect its news if it does so in a peaceable and legal fashion."
Id. at 683, 251 N.Y. Supp. at 618.
9. Instant case at 259-60, 126 A.2d at 683.
10. WESTMORSLAND COUNTY CT. RuLe 6084(d), quoted at note 2 supra.
11. PRosssR, ToRTs 637. n.43 (2d ed. 1955). "
12. The right of privacy is generally referred to as the right to live one's life
in seclusion without being subjected to unwarranted and undesired publicity. E.g., Kerby
v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 210, 127 P.2d 577, 579 (1942). Al-
though the right of privacy has been judicially recognized in other states, this is the
first appellate court decision in which it has been held to exist in Pennsylvania. Hull v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 182 Pa. Super. 86, 94 (1956) ; cf. Waring v. WDAS Broadcast-
ing Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 456, 194 Atl. 631, 649 (1937) (concurring opinion). The
right has been held to exist in Pennsylvania in lower court decisions, Clayman v.
Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543, 545 (Philadelphia C. P. 1940) ; Harlow v. Buno, 36 Pa.
D. & C. 101, 104 (Philadelphia C. P. 1939), and in a federal court decision, Leverton
v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951).
13. Cases have uniformly held that persons directly connected with litigation or
crimes are sufficiently affected with a public interest so as to have no protection for
invasion of right of privacy. E.g., Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir.
1946) (radio commentator discussed private life of defendant in criminal action);
Jenkins v. Dell Publications Co., 143 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Pa. 1956) (publication of
picture of family of murder victim) ; Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F.
Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948) (publication of picture taken in courtroom of party to a
divorce action) ; Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 277, 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929) (pub-
lication of picture of witness to murder) ; Thermo v. New England Newspaper Pub-
lishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 753 (1940) (publication of picture of robbery
victim while speaking to police). It has been held that ". . .if the news item constitutes
legitimate news, the picture seems entirely appropriate to the news." Berg v. Minne-
apolis Star & Tribune Co., supra at 961.
14. Instant case at 260, 126 A.2d at 683.
15. Id. at 259, 126 A.2d at 683.
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the prisoner has no means of evading photographers while in the court's
control. It is not clear which interpretation the court intended, but both of
these raise problems of interference with the constitutionally-protected right
of freedom of the press.16 Only a substantial public interest has been held
to justify any interference or restriction of this freedom."m Courts have
refused to limit it despite allegations that a newspaper's articles deprived
a prisoner of a fair trial,' 8 unfairly reported events of cases 19 or made
hostile editorial attacks in pending cases. The photographs prohibited
in the instant case, while perhaps not as necessary for public information 21
as some other news items that might have been printed, were informative
of an event of public interest.2l Moreover, if the instant decision means
that the prisoner has a legally enforceable right not to have his picture
taken or published, it is doubtful that it should be protected by a rule
of court since a damage remedy would be available.P In the analogous area
of libel, damages have been held an adequate remedy so as to foreclose
injunctive relief.24 The harm resulting from publication of a libel seems
16. U.S. CoNsT. amends. 1 and XIV, § 1. The motion picture has been held to a
medium of expression within the constitutional guaranty. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 499-502 (1952). Inasmuch as the newspaper photograph is like-
wise a medium of expression and perhaps a more essential means of transmitting in-
formation, it also would seem to be included. More recently, in another motion picture
case, it was said that ". . .the First Amendment draws no distinction between the
various methods of communicating ideas." Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of
Education, 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954) (concurring opinion).
17. Convictions for contempt have been reversed because they were unlawful
restraints on the freedom of the press in Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947)
(unfair reporting of events in a case and editorial attack on trial judge) ; Permekamp
v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (editorial attack on court actions in non-jury pro-
ceedings) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (hostile editorial comment on
pending cases).
18. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A2d 497 (1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
19. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
20. Craig v. Harney, supra note 19.
21. See instant case at 257, 126 A2d at 682, where the court said that "the taking
of a picture of a person called for sentence certainly does not inform the public as to
any material facts, and serves no purpose except to pander to the lower tastes of
some individuals."
22. The United States Supreme Court, in discussing allegedly obscene magazines,
said, "The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protec-
tion of that basic right [freedom of the press] .... What is one man's amusement teaches
another's doctrine." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). "What is good
literature, what has educational value, what is refined public information, what is good
art, varies with individuals... But a requirement that literature or art conform to some
norm... smacks of an ideology foreign to our system." Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327
U.S. 146, 157-58 (1946).
23. There is apparently no reason why a prisoner, even a convicted murderer,
would not be permitted to enforce his civil remedies in most instances. See Wilson v.
King, 59 Ark. 32, 26 S.W. 18 (1894) (plaintiff sentenced to death in another state) ;
Kenyon v. Saunders, 18 R.I. 590, 30 Atl. 470 (1894) (plaintiff serving fifteen-year
sentence for manslaughter).
24. E.g., Kuhn v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 29 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1939);
Kwass v. Kersey, 139 W. Va. 497, 508, 81 S.E.2d 237, 243 (1954): cf. Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. United Retail Employees, CIO, 400 Ill. 38, 79 N.E.2d 46 (1948)
(injunction denied on the ground that it would constitute a prior restraint on the
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at least as serious, if not more so, than that resulting from the publication
of a photograph. 5 Hence, if damages is an adequate remedy in the former
case, it should suffice here. If the court did not intend that a damage
remedy be available, then it is more difficult to locate the right of privacy
which the court felt bound to protect. In either event, weighed against the
freedom of the press, the novel right of privacy imputed to the prisoner in
these circumstances seems inadequate to justify the limitation here imposed.
Criminal Law-
ENTRAPMENT BY STATE OFFICER IS
DEFENSE TO FEDERAL CRIME
A state deputy sheriff, without revealing his office, persuaded defendant
to join him in distilling untaxed liquor. Defendant was subsequently tried
and convicted for manufacturing such liquor in violation of the Internal
Revenue Code.1  On appeal the circuit court reversed, holding it error
for the district court to have refused to charge the jury on entrapment,
notwithstanding that it was a state officer who had induced defendant to
commit the federal crime.2 Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169 (5th
Cir. 1956).
Short of insanity, the weak-willed are not excused from criminal
liability.3 As a consequence, the fact that one has been induced by another
to commit a crime is no defense in a prosecution for the crime.4  However,
where federal officers, or persons working with them as agents,5 induce one
freedom of the press). See also it re Hearings Concerning Canon 35, 296 P.2d 465,
470 (Colo. 1956), where it is stated that canon 35, which prohibits the taking of pictures
within the courtroom, cannot be sustained on the ground that it insures the right of
privacy of a defendant because, even if he has such a right, the rule would be an uncon-
stitutional prior restraint on the freedom of the press.
25. Libel is a written defamatory statement communicated to others which tends
to diminish the esteem in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse feelings or
opinions against him. PaossXR, ToRTs 572 (2d ed. 1955). Truth is a complete defense
to an action for libel. Id. at 630. The right of privacy seems to protect a plaintiff from
undesired "nuisances." An action to protect this right assumes the truth of the matter
printed, and no special damages need be shown. Id. at 641-42. Thus, it would seem
that the injury suffered by an aggrieved party in a libel action would exceed that in a
privacy action. Furthermore, while ordinarily a person can more easily protect himself
from invasions of his privacy than he can from the publication of libel, the fact that a
prisoner is unable to do so because-he is subject to the court's control does no more
than make him equally as open to invasion of privacy as to libel.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1952).
2. The issue was raised independently by the court, apparently not being argued
by either party. See instant case at 174-75.
3. See CLARt , & MARsHALL, CRIMSs § 82 (5th ed. 1952).
4. Polski v. United States, 33 F.2d 686 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 591
(1929); see Jindra v. United States, 69 F.2d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 1934); Newman v.
United States, 28 F.2d 681, 682 (9th Cir. 1928).
5. See, e.g., Ryles v. United States, 193 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1950); Morei v.
United States, 127 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1942).
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to commit a federal crime in order to prosecute him, federal courts allow him
the defense that he has been "entrapped." 6 Similarly, state courts recognize
the entrapment defense when state officers procure the commission of
a state offense. 7 The instant case presents for the first time the question
of whether entrapment should be available as a defense in a federal prose-
cution where a state officer procured the criminal act and there was no
evidence of agreement between the state officer and his federal counterparts.
Reasoning that state officers have power to enforce federal laws, and that a
pattern of cooperation in enforcement exists between state and federal
officers, the instant court concluded that state officers hold a sufficient rela-
tionship to the federal government to justify permitting the defense of
entrapment.
It is possible to explain the instant decision as an extension of the
principle which recognizes entrapment when the crime is induced by
agents of federal officers. In certain areas of criminal enforcement such
as bank robbery, narcotics and kidnapping, where state and federal laws
overlap and state and federal officials traditionally cooperate closely,8 a
court might be justified in finding the required agency relationship as a
matter of law even absent evidence of actual agreement. Unlawful distilla-
tion of liquor seems within this category. However, the language of the
instant decision suggests that the court contemplated a broader rule which
would allow the defense regardless of the existence of a pattern of coopera-
tion as to the particular crime involved.9 Thus, some other rationale is
required. It would appear that the underlying justifications for the defense
6. See Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 91 U. PA. L.
REv. 245 (1942). The defense was not known to the early common law, nor is it ex-
pressly the product of any statute. United States v. Washington, 20 F.2d 160, 161 (D.
Neb. 1927). A necessary element of the defense is that the criminal intent originate in
the mind of the entrapping officer, and that he transmit the plan to one who was pre-
viously guiltless. Where the court is convinced that the defendant had possessed the
criminal intent prior to his encounter with the "entrapping" officer, it will approve the
acts of the officer, or his agent, on the theory that it is permissible to use traps,
decoys and deception to further the ends of the criminal law. See CLARK & MARSHALL,
CRMEs §§ 153-55 (5th ed. 1952). See also Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,
453-54 (1932) (concurring opinion) ; United States v. Chiarella, 184 F.2d 903, 908 (2d
Cir. 1950). There is language in some of the cases to the effect that the defense will
only be recognized where the crime is malum in se. E.g., State v. Broaddus, 315 Mo.
1279, 1285, 289 S.W. 792, 795 (1926). The defense is utilized most frequently in con-
nection with prosecutions under sumptuary legislation dealing the repression of vice.
E.g., United States v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1951) (narcotics) ; United States
v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933) (obscene material in the mails). In the area of
larceny and burglary an analogous but separate problem arises where the victim con-
sents to the defendant's taking. Here, the defendant is not guilty because one of the
elements of the common-law crime is lacking. See Annot., 18 A.L.R. 149 (1922). On
the distinction between consent and entrapment, see People v. Werner, 16 Cal. 2d 216,
224, 105 P.2d 927, 932 (1940) ; State v. Nelson, 232 N.C. 602, 61 S.E.2d 626 (1950).
7. See cases collected in Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool
Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1105 n.41 (1951).
8. See, e.g., Note, A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, 53 CoLu. L. REv. 540,
545 n.32 (1953).
9. See instant case at 176.
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are considerations of fairness and effective law enforcement procedures. 10
For law enforcement agents to instigate the commission of criminal acts
by persons not otherwise inclined to commit crime, and then to prosecute
such persons, is offensive to the community." If prosecution were suc-
cessful in such cases, enforcement officials would have a powerful weapon
for abuse. Furthermore, entrapping diverts the limited time and resources
of law enforcement officers from other criminal activity to which they
might direct their efforts.12  There appears no basis, on these grounds, for
distinguishing between federal and state officers as entrappers. Neverthe-
less, in the area of illegally obtained evidence, which similarly involves
undesirable police activity, the federal courts, while excluding such
evidence when obtained by federal officers,' 3 have felt no obligation to do
so as to state officers in the absence of definite collaboration. 1 4 This equat-
ing of state officers to private citizens in the federal courts may also support
restriction of the entrapment defense. There are, however, sufficient
differences between entrapment and illegally obtained evidence to justify
the federal courts in extending their responsibility in the former area.
In search and seizure the offensive police activity concerns only the gather-
ing of evidence and has no substantive relation to the commission of the
alleged crime; in entrapment the unconscionable conduct has prompted
the actual commission of the crime. Moreover, if the courts fail to dis-
courage entrapment there is no other sanction, for an entrapped defendant
has no cause of action against his entrapper,15 whereas both penal and civil
sanctions are available to redress an illegal search or seizure.16 Finally,
only a minority of the states follow the federal rule as to the exclusion
10. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 446 (1932); United States v.
Becker, 62 F2d 1007, 1009 (2d Cir. 1933). Several doctrinal explanations for the
existence of the defense have been advanced by the courts. It has been said that the
government is estopped by the conduct of its officers from prosecuting the defendant,
e.g., United States v. Kaiser, 138 F.2d 219, 220 (7th Cir. 1943) (dictum) ; and that
the courts have a duty to see that justice is administered in a manner which does not
abuse the processes of government, e.g., United States v. Becker, supra at 1009. The
Supreme Court has construed a criminal statute so as to find an "entrapped" defendant's
acts outside the purview of congressional intent. Sorrells v. United States, supra at
448-49.
11. Cf. id at 454-55 (concurring opinion).
12. It might be argued that the police are using only what would appear to be
necessary enforcement measures in order to take into custody persons who already
have a guilty intent. But see note 6 supra.
13. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); ef. Gambino v. United States,
275 U.S. 310 (1927).
14. 8 WrGmom, Evmzxcr § 2184a(2) (3d ed. 1940). See Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) ; Losieau v. United States, 177 F.2d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 1949);
Lotto v. United States, 157 F.2d 623, 625-26 (5th Cir. 1946).
15. But ef. Commonwealth ex rel. Shea v. Leeds, 9 Phila. (Pa.) 569 (1872) (en-
trapping officer convicted of conspiracy). The court stated that "it was never intended
that a man should violate the law in order to vindicate the law." Id. at 570.
16. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30 n.1 (1949), for a list of remedies
available to the victim. See also Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure,
70 HAv L. Rrv. 1 (1956). In addition, there is a potential remedy under the Criminal
Code, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1952).
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of illegally obtained evidence,' 7 so that conflicts between state and federal
police policy would arise should the federal courts extend their exclusionary
rule to state officers. But only Tennessee has rejected entrapment; -8 thus,
for the federal courts to extend the defense to state officers would merely
deprive these officers of the benefit of conduct that is prohibited by their
own governments. The instant court's conclusion therefore seems proper.
Should the problem of entrapment by federal officers arise in a state court,
the foregoing analysis would appear to dictate an identical result.
Government Contracts-
GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER LOWEST
"RESPONSIBLE BID" SUPPORTS RECOVERY OF
BID COSTS ON IMPLIED CONTRACT THEORY
In response to an advertisement by the Army's Ordnance Tank
Automotive Center (OTAC), plaintiff manufacturer submitted a bid to
furnish low-voltage circuit testers. OTAC purchasing procedures were
governed by the Armed Services Procurement Act,' which required that
the "award shall be made . . . to that responsible bidder whose bid
. . .will be most advantageous to the Government . . .., 2 When the
contract was awarded to a bid almost twice as high as his,3 plaintiff sued
the United States in the Court of Claims to recover his bid preparation
expenses and loss of anticipated profits. He alleged that his failure to
receive the contract was due to a bad faith refusal of the procurement
officials to consider his bid,4 supporting his claim by the results of an
investigation by the Senate Committee on Small Business.5 On defend-
17. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, app. (1949).
18. Goins v. State, 192 Tenn. 32, 40, 237 S.W2d 8, 12 (1951). See Donnelly, mtpra
note 7, at 1105-06 and cases collected in nn. 41 & 42.
1. 62 STAT. 21 (1948), 41 U.S.C. §§ 151-61 (1952) (later re-enacted in 10 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2301-14, 2381-82 (Supp. 1956)).
2. 62 STAT. 21 (1948), 41 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1952) (later re-enacted in 10 U.S.C.A.
§2305(b) (Supp. 1956)).
3. Plaintiff's bid was $205,975 as compared to the accepted bid of $396,018, a dif-
ference of $190,043. Instant case at 410.
4. Plaintiff alleged that the award was the result of "a deliberate artifice to re-
taliate against plaintiff for testifying against OTAC at a Senate hearing in 1952; that
defendant deliberately and in violation of law wished to favor the successful bidder,
and that defendant's action throughout the entire transaction was arbitrary, capricious,
and taken in bad faith." Ibid.
5. S. Ri4'. No. 1092, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-20 (1954). The Senate's Committee on
Small Business had investigated the rejection of the instant bid and a prior bid under
similar circumstances. The Committee concluded that the award had been improperly
made under "shameful" circumstances which indicated the need of a possible revision
in the procurement act to limit the officials' discretion. Id. at 20.
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ant's motion to dismiss for failure to state an actionable claim, the court
held that there could be no recovery of contractual profits since there was
no contract for circuit testers, and that plaintiff had no standing to sue
for violation of the statute. Plaintiff was, however, entitled to recover
the expenses of his bid because the Government had failed to perform
an implied promise to accord the bid fair and impartial consideration.
Heyer Products Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
In the absence of an express contract, disappointed bidders have been
singularly unsuccessful in attempts to recover from the United States.
It is uniformly held that an unsuccessful bidder has no standing to invoke
the procurement statute or implementing regulations because these are
promulgated solely for the benefit of the Government. 6 Courts conclude
that the bidder has not suffered an invasion of recognized legal rights 7
since procurement statutes do not "in terms, or by necessary implication,
provide that the submission of a low bid automatically compels the Gov-
ernment or its agents, to enter a contract... ,, s Assuming that the
actions of the official were sufficient to make out a claim in tort,9 it is clear
that a recovery against the Government under the Federal Tort Claims
Act 10 would be precluded by provisions specifically excluding liability for
an agent's "abuse of discretion" 1 or misrepresentation and deceit.' 2 In
addition, it has been held that a disappointed bidder has no cause of action
for breach of an implied contract to make the award in conformance with
6. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Royal Sundries Corp. v.
United States, 112 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1953); cf. Friend v. Lee, 221 F.2d 96
(D.C. Cir. 1955).
7. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); cf. Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). But see the partial dissent of Judge Madden in the instant
case: "[T]he background of this statute seems to me to show that another purpose of
the statute was to give small businessmen the right to get Government contracts....
I would treat the plaintiff's claim as one founded upon an Act of Congress. If the Act
has been violated . . .I would give him a judgment for the damage." Instant case at
414.
8. Royal Sundries Corp. v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1953).
9. For example, in the instant case the plaintiff might have a good common-law
cause of action for deceit, which is applicable when the claimant has parted with money
or property of value in reliance upon the defendant's false representations of fact.
PRossa, ToRTs 522-23 (2d ed. 1955). The situation appears analogous to a purchase
of goods with no intent to pay, for which courts have allowed recovery in deceit. See,
e.g., Donovan v. Clifford, 225 Mass. 435, 114 N.E. 681 (1917); Swift v. Rounds, 19
R.I. 527, 35 Atl. 45 (1896).
10. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1952). The act allows suit against the Gov-
ernment for the torts of its servants or agents in circumstances in which a private
employer would be responsible under agency law. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1952).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1952) provides that the act shall not apply to "any claim
based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care,
in the execution of a statute or regulation...or.. .upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty. . .whether or not
the discretion involved be abused." This exception has been construed as extremely
broad. See Dalchite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) ; Note, The Discretionary
Fuxticon Exceptiom of the Federal Tort Clains Act, 66 H.,v. L. Rmv. 488 (1953).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1952).
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the statute.1 3 The instant decision, holding the Government bound by an
implied contract to give the bid fair consideration, even though the re-
coverable damages are limited to preparation expenses, is unique in allow-
ing an injured bidder a right to question arbitrary procurement practices.
The Tucker Act 14 gives the Court of Claims "jurisdiction to render
judgment upon any claim . . . founded upon any . . . implied con-
tract with the United States." 15 Generally, the term "implied contract"
may refer either to an implied in fact contract arising out of the intentions
of the parties, or to an implied in law or "quasi-contract"-a judicial con-
struction to allow recovery irrespective of intent when a benefit has been
conferred.16 In addition, at common law recovery might be allowed when
there has been a reasonable change of position in reliance on the manifesta-
tions of another, regardless of whether a benefit has been conferred.
17
Under the Tucker Act decisions have followed the generally accepted view 18
that the term "implied contract" in a statute refers only to a contract implied
in fact.19 However, in suits against the Government, the court's finding
that a claim is based merely on a contract implied in law is little more
than a legal conclusion to preclude recovery, since scant, if any, weight is
given to the manifestations of the parties. With the exception of some
cases which have implied terms in an existing contract,20 plaintiffs have
been unsuccessful unless a benefit has been conferred on the Government
under circumstances which clearly indicate consent by the Government
to make compensation.2 1  Consent has been found from the constitutional
13. Martin v. United States, 61 Ct. Cl. 430 (1926).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1952).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(4) (1952).
16. See KzssixR & SHARP, CONTRACTS 80-83 (1953); 3 CoRmN, CONTRAcTS § 561
(1950); I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 3 (rev. ed. 1938). The measure of damages in
quasi-contract is restitution for the unjust enrichment of the defendant, while in the
implied in fact contract the damages are based on reliance or loss of expectations. The
line of demarcation is clouded, however, by the fact that intent may be construed from
objective manifestations, which could lead a court to apply either doctrine on the same
facts. Courts seldom specify what type of implied contract they have found, and the
situation is further complicated by the fact that the defendant's enrichment (benefit)
may be measured by the plaintiff's loss. See authorities cited supra.
17. Kearns v. Andree, 107 Conn. 181, 139 AtI. 695 (1928); cf. Embry v. Harga-
dine, McKittrick Co., 127 Mo. App. 383, 105 S.W. 777 (1907); Kukuska v. Home
Mut. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 166, 235 N.W. 403 (1931). Analogous methods of protecting
reliance are promissory estoppel, silence as acceptance, and construing offers as intend-
ing bilateral rather than unilateral contracts. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance In-
terest in Contract Damages, 46 Y.Am L.J. 52, 373 (1936-1937).
18. 3 CoRBIN, CoNTRAcTs 171 n.15 (1950).
19. United States v. Minnesota Mut. Co., 271 U.S. 212, 217 (1926); Gazda v.
United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 760, 764-65, 108 F. Supp. 516, 519 (1952).
20. See United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53 (1876); Hughes Transp. Co. v.
United States, 128 Ct. Cl. 221, 121 F. Supp. 212 (1954); Carstens Packing Co. v.
United States, 62 F. Supp. 524 (D.D.C. 1945).
21. The mere receipt of a benefit is not sufficient. See Schillinger v. United States,
155 U.S. 163 (1894) ; Gazda v. United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 760, 108 F. Supp. 516 (1952).
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interdiction against taking private property for public use without just
compensation 2 and from the express terms of a statute,3 but seldom, if
ever, has it been found solely from the conduct of the government repre-
sentative. Thus, it has been held that a request for professional services
was not sufficient to imply a promise to compensate therefor.2 4 Although
it may be argued that the Government's receipt of the bid was a benefit,
the instant decision is apparently the first to imply a contract when consent
not only is lacking 2 but also, by analogy to the denial of liability for
"abuse of discretion" under the Federal Tort Claims Act, appears to have
been specifically withheld. 28
Previous strict denials of recovery under the procurement statutes,
the Tucker Act, and the Federal Tort Claims Act have reflected a policy
of immunity designed to prevent interference with the efficient operation
of the Government2 7 In procurement practice, efficiency requires that
agents have wide discretion 2 8-- especially since they must consider not
only price and the bidder's competence, but also the maintenance of
competition and encouragement of small business to ensure a broad
market.2 9 By imposing on the Government a duty to give "fair considera-
tion" to bids, the court narrows discretion by employing a vague standard
which could lead to excessive litigation by disappointed bidders and en-
courage the award of contracts on a "lowest price" basis.80 However,
forcing a contractor who deals with the Government to do so completely
at his own risk,3 ' if carried to the extreme of protecting an agent's deliberate
22. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; see Portsmouth Harbor Hotel Co. v. United States,
260 U.S. 327 (1922) ; United States v. Buffalo Pitts Co., 234 U.S. 228 (1913).
23. Aycock-Lindsey Corp. v. United States, 171 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1948).
24. Gazda v. United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 760, 108 F. Supp. 516 (1952) ; cf. Atwater
& Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 188 (1927); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. United States,
261 U.S. 385 (1923). See also Notes, 38 HARv. L. REv. 1104 (1925), 43 YALE L.J.
674 (1934).
25. In the absence of the procurement statute, consent could only be inferred from
the dealings between the parties, which under previous interpretations of the Tucker
Act has not been sufficient. See text at notes 20-24 supra. To hold that consent was
evidenced in the statute would be to hold, in effect, that the plaintiff had standing to
sue on the statute, a view expressly rejected by the instant court.
26. See note 11 supra,
27. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); United States
v. Alleghany County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S.
151 (1886).
28. S. Ri. No. 571, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1947). Indeed, the legislative
history of the Armed Services Procurement Act shows that one of the announced
purposes was to broaden the discretion of the contracting officer in order to prevent
the awarding of contracts "primarily on the lowest-price basis, irrespective of the best
public interest.. .in a purely mechanical way .. .[which is not in all cases] the best way
of doing business." Id. at 2.
29. The requirement that a fair proportion of the contracts be placed with small
business concerns was to "aid in the development of a larger number of known and
capable suppliers. . .thus affording added production security in the event of any
emergency and assist[ing] in establishing insurance against acute production bottle-
necks." Id. at 6.
30. See note 28 supra.
31. Recovery for acts performed by a government agent in the exercise of his dis-
cretionary duties is denied on the rationale that it is the threat of personal liability
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discrimination, appears inconsistent with the stated policy of Congress to
encourage bidding 3 2 in order "to secure for the Government the benefits
which arise from competition." 3 In view of the mutual benefits derived
from contractual dealings, individual rights should be circumvented by
immunity only to the extent necessary to ensure efficiency. 34 The instant
case, if limited to its facts,35 appears to establish a satisfactory limit on
discretion without unduly hampering procurement efficiency. In confining
the recovery of damages to the reliance interest, it is doubtful that excessive
litigation will result. Also, allowing the plaintiff to claim on an implied
contract does not compromise the agent's discretion insofar as that dis-
cretion rests on personal immunity,3 6 since there is no indication that
recovery against the Government would lead to the agent's subsequent
liability37 Furthermore, the desired objectives of the statutes and regu-
lations may be promoted by providing a judicial forum in which procure-
ment shortcomings can be aired.
which would tend to prevent efficient discharge of the agent's duties. Gregoire v. Bid-
dle, 177 F.2d 579, 580-81 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950) ; see Block,
Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 -Agv. L.
Rzv. 1060, 1061 (1946).
32. See note 29 supra.
33. United States v. Brookridge Farm, 111 F2d 461, 463 (10th Cir. 1940).
34. In addition to the foregoing difficulties confronting contractors, courts have
developed a "federal common law" of contracts on the principle that "the government
stands on a different footing" and requires special protection against fraud. United
States v. Lipman, 122 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1954) ; Scott v. United States, 44
Ct. Cl. 524, 531-32 (1909). Thus, contracts have been voided for unilateral mistakes,
Condenser Service & Engineering Co. v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 186, 115 F. Supp.
203 (1953), and bids are held irrevocable even in the absence of consideration, United
States v. Lipman, supra; Refining Associates, Inc. v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 115,
109 F. Supp. 259 (1953).
At common law, bids are revocable unless supported by consideration. 1 CoRmN,
CoNTRACTs § 47 (1950). An argument can be made, therefore, that the consideration
for irrevocability in the case of government contracting .is the promise to give the bid
fair consideration. Indeed, irrevocability has been justified on this ground. Refining
Associates, Inc. v. United States, supra. It is more probable, however, that courts find
irrevocability because the regulations so provide. 32 C.F.R. § 401.303 (1951). See
Refining Associates, Inc. v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 115, 122, 109 F. Supp. 259, 262
(1953) ; United States v. Lipman, supra. Since the Armed Services Procurement Act
does not provide for irrevocability, the validity of the regulations as applied to con-
tractors has been strongly questioned as an improper delegation of legislative power.
Steltzenmuller, Formation of Government Contracts-Application of Common Law
Principles, 40 CoRMLL L.Q. 238 (1955). Althdugh the imposition of a duty under a
regulation, even if improper, is not a conclusive argument for implying a correlative
right in the bidder, it can serve as a justification for such a result in the interests of
mutuality.
35. See note 4 supra.
36. See note 31 supra.
37. The Supreme Court has denied the Government indemnification for damages
incurred through liability for a servant's tort under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
United States v. Gihhan, 347 U.S. 507 (1954). A fortiori it is unlikely that the Gov-
ernment could recover its damages from the agent when no tort has been found, even
though the gist of the bidder's action may be considered fraudulent conduct. This is
especially true in view of the desire to protect the agent from the threat of individual
liability. See note 31 supra. Indeed, it has been suggested that an expansion of gov-
ernmental liability could further the interest in fearless administration by relieving the
courts of the choice between holding remediless a deserving plaintiff and finding the
agent individually liable. Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort Liability, 55 MicH. L.
Rzv. 201, 232-33 (1956).
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Radio-Television-
FCC RULES THAT PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS DOES NOT ENTITLE
OPPOSITION CANDIDATES TO EQUAL AIR TIME
UNDER SECTION 315 OF COMMUNICATIONS ACT
On October 31, 1956, the major radio and television networks pro-
vided free time for the President to deliver a "non-political" 1 address on
the Middle East crisis.2 Immediately after the President's speech, the
Democratic presidential candidate demanded equivalent free time under
section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934, which provides "if any
licensee [station] shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate
for public office to use a broadcasting station . . . [the licensee] shall
afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the
use of such broadcasting station. . . ." The following day network
officials requested an immediate ruling from the Federal Communications
Commission as to whether Governor Stevenson was entitled to such time.
The Commission refused an immediate ruling,4 but five days later on
November fifth, the day before the election, announced that a report of
the President on an international crisis was not such "use" as would
entitle opposing candidates to equal air time.5 FCC Letter to Radio and
Television Networks, 14 PIKE & FISCHER RADIO REG. 722 (Nov. 5, 1956).
Section 315 expresses no standards for determining what con-
stitutes a "use" by a "legally qualified" 6 candidate such as will entitle other
1. Mr. Eisenhower characterized his role in making the address as that of "Pres-
ident of all the people." N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1956, p. 14, col. 3.
2. For text of address, see ibid.
3. 48 STAAT. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1952):
"(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate
for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities
to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station:
Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material
broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed upon any
licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate.
(b) The charges made for the use of any broadcasting station for any of the
purposes set forth in this section shall not exceed the charges made for comparable use
of such station for other purposes.
(c) The Commission shall prescribe appropriate rules and regulations to carry out
the provisions of this section."
4. The refusal was based on the Commission's hesitancy to act quickly on such an
"involved and complicated interpretation." 14 Pixm & FiscxER RADIo RwO. 720 (1956)
(letter to Frank Stanton, President of CBS).
5. The Commission did not articulate its decision in statutory terms, stating only:
"[W]e do not believe that when Congress enacted Section 315 it intended to grant
equal time to all Presidential candidates when the President uses the air lanes in report-
ing to the Nation on an international crisis." Instant ruling at 722.
6. Who is a "legally qualified candidate" is to be determined by state law. 47
C.F.R. § 3.190 (1953). The meaning of the term has not been judicially determined.
See WARuEa, RADio AND T ISIoN LAw § 34 e (1948).
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such candidates to "equal opportunities." 7 Nor has the Federal Com-
munications Commission, empowered to implement the statute by regu-
lation,8 chosen to define "use." Nevertheless, the Commission has fur-
nished letter rulings 0 at the request of individuals in a number of specific
cases, holding that appearances on panel shows, 10 quiz programs" and
news broadcasts 12 are "uses" within the meaning of section 315.13 In
addition, the Commission has found "uses" where incumbent candidates
have made "informative and nonpartisan" reports to their constituents,14
and has ruled that an appeal by the President on behalf of a charity would
entitle opposition candidates to equal time.15 While it has not been
judicially determined, it would appear that these letter rulings are not
"orders" and are, therefore, not subject to direct review.'0  Such rulings
may be tested collaterally, however, by a candidate seeking to compel a
station to allow him equal time.' 7 The instant decision is the first in which
the Commission has found an appearance by a candidate not to be a "use."
Neither the language of section 315 nor its legislative history 18 in-
dicate that Congress intended other than that "use" include all appear-
7. "Equal opportunity" means equal to all candidates as to cost for a specific hour
and has been construed by the Commission to require, in addition, that the hour afforded
be equal with respect to audience potential. Stephens Broadcasting Co., 11 F.C.C. 61
(1945).
8. Communications Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 1082, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (r)
(1952).
9. Letter rulings are informal administrative decisions. See DAvis, ADmnisTRATM
LAw 139 (1951). While agency practice varies as to the content of such rulings, the
FCC is accustomed to merely state its conclusion without giving its rationale. FCC
letter rulings are collected in PiKE & Fisci m RAnio REG. On their reviewability, see
text at notes 16-17 infra.
10. 10 Pix & Fisczma RAnio Rim. 451 (1952) (letter to Sen. Mike Monroney).
11. Ibid.
12. 11 Pim & FiscHim RAD o RzG. 240 (1952) (letter to Julius Brauner). For
other examples of "uses," see 11 Pixi & FiscHm RAnio R. 241 (1952) (letter to
radio station WVBM) (broadcast of a speech made by Governor Stevenson while a
candidate for President at a Governor's Day program at a state fair a "use") and 7
P= & FIscHam RADio Ru. 1300 (1952) (letter to the Progressive Party) (an
acceptance speech by a successful candidate for nomination for the candidacy of a
particular party for a given office a "use").
13. These rulings prompted an effort to amend § 315 to exempt such programs.
H.R. 6810, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) (not reported out of committee). See Hear-
ings Before the Subcommittee on Miscellaneous Bills To Anend the Communications
Act of 1934 of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1956).
14. 11 PiK & Fiscim RADio R80. 234 (1952) (letter to Hon. Allen Oakley
Hunter); 11 Pirg & FiscnR RA~io Rw. 243 (1953) (letter to Carbondale Broad-
casting Co.) (report by mayor); 7 Pint & FxscHx RADio RY. 1130 (1952) (letter
to Radio station KGNS) (weekly sustaining program entitled "Report From Congress"
in which Senator Knowland answered questions on matters of public importance).
15. 14 Pnx & FiscxRF RAD o Ro. 524 (1956) (letter to CBS, Inc.).
16. Communications Act of 1934, 48 S T.. 1093, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 402
(1952); see DAvis, ADmiNisTRATIV LAw 139 (1951); cf. Columbia Broadcasting
System v. United States, 316 U.S. 411, 416 (1941).
17. Yates v. Associated Broadcasters, Inc., 7 Pixn & FIscHi RADIo Ri. 2088
(N.D. Cal. 1951).
18. Section 315 is identical to § 18 of the Radio Act of 1927, c. 3, 44 STAT. 1552,
78 Coxa. REc. 10988 (1934). For a representative statement of congressional intention,
see H.R. Ri. No. 404, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1926).
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ances. If there is any basis for limiting "use," it is the inference to be
drawn from the obvious statutory objective of facilitating political debate
that Congress intended "use" to include only political appearances. This
provides no justification for the instant result, however, in view of the
inevitable political impact of the President's address 19 and prior decisions
treating other apparently "non-political" appearances as "uses." 20  Never-
theless, there may.be pragmatic justification for construing "use" to exclude
the instant situation. If "use" is interpreted otherwise, when a presi-
dential request for free time is granted the station is obligated under
section 315 to provide all other "legally qualified" candidates equal free
time with comparable audience potential. Since "legally qualified" in-
cludes not only the major party opponent but, in addition, all persons
"qualified" under vagaries of state law,2 1 there will be a substantial financial
burden on the stations. 2 On the other hand, while a station may deny
a presidential request for free time, 2 thus leaving the President the choice
of paying for his time 2 4 or not appearing at all, stations can ill afford to
do so. Unquestionably, they would incur unfavorable public sentiment
which is particularly damaging in a business so dependent upon popular
attitudes.a Of comparable significance is the likelihood that such action
might invoke the disfavor of the agency 2 6 and members of the Adminis-
19. For discussion of the specific effects of mass media on political controversy,
see generally RnisMAN, Tp LONELY CRowD 182 (1950); MIAMI UNivmsiTY DX-
PARTTMENT Ol MARimTING, Tnt INrLUzwa or TttuvisioN ON THn ELmCtIoN or 1952
(1954); RoSSITM, TEn AiwcAw PRtImDiNcY 18 (1956); SCHNZIDmR, Tar* GOLDN
KAzoo (1956) (fictional account of political campaign by television).
20. See notes 10-15, supra. Note that the FCC is not bound by stare decisis. FCC
v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 228 (1946) ; see ATTOP.mr y Grm-N's ComminTr ON
AmmNss rvzm PaoczmR, FINAL REPORT 416 (1941) : "It is believed by some that
the Communications Commission goes further than other agencies of comparable
importance in refusing to give weight to its own earlier decisions."
21. See note 6 supra. Compare, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2911 (Purdon
1938), wuith CAL. ELeCtIONS CoDm ANN. §§ 3040-43 (West 1955). The number of
presidential candidates in 1952 has been variously estimated at from twelve to eighteen.
Hearings, supra note 13, at 175.
22. In 1952, a half-hour TV network broadcast at a desirable time could cost a
candidate more than $30,000. Reston, Radio, TV and 1956-An Account of the
New Difliculties Facing Broadcasters in the Campaign, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1955,
p. 20, col. 2. Of course, the burden would be less if the President paid for his time,
see note 24 infra, in which case opposing candidates would have to pay an equal rate.
23. Even assuming a broad emergency power inherent in the presidency, it does not
follow that such power would entitle the President to free time. RossiTim, T319
AmEmcAN PRESIDENCY 21 (1956) : cf. Youngstown Steel Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952) (steel seizure). Section 315 explicitly states there is no obligation to accept
campaign speeches initially. See note 3 supra. But see concurring opinion of Commis-
sioner Doerfer in instant decision at 722 and Note, 61 YAr- LJ. 87, 88 (1952).
24. Such expenditures could be made from the general fund for the White House
Office. U.S. Psm=NT, MgssAG5 TRANSMITTING THZ BuDGI T 58 (1957).
25. The responsiveness of the listening public has been called to the attention of
Congress. Hearings, supra note 13, at 186. Illustrative is the furor caused by CBS's
refusal to carry a film shown at the Democratic convention depicting the successes of
the Democratic Party. N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1956, p. 12, col. 2. Sponsors, too, are
sensitive to such public response. Letter from Charles Vanda, vice president in charge
of television, station WCAU, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Feb. 15,
1957, on file in Biddle Law Library.
26. A station's license is subject to periodic renewal, Communications Act of
1934, 48 STAi'. 1083, 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1952), at which time the agency determines
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tration.27 But despite the dilemma in which the stations are placed by a
presidential request for free time during an election campaign, the public
interest in affording candidates equal opportunities seems dearly superior
to the need to protect the stations. Without a clear congressional mandate,
the instant decision was not justified. Furthermore, it does little to miti-
gate the plight of the stations, for unaccompanied by any explanation of
its scope and import it provides no guide for action. Since it is unlikely
that the Commission will be more inclined in the future to give immediate
rulings than in the instant situation,28 the stations will be forced to reach
their own decisions on requests for time. To avoid risks attendant an
incorrect decision,29 stations will have little choice but to grant equal time to
opposition candidates.30
Sales-
JUDGMENT FOR PRICE ENTERED BY CONFESSION
UPON BUYER'S ANTICIPATORY BREACH OPENED
AS "UNREASONABLE" LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
UNDER UCC SECTION 2-718
A conditional sale agreement 1 for refrigeration equipment provided
that "in the event of default by purchaser" seller would have, in addition
to all rights under the Uniform Commercial Code,2 certain other rights
whether the operation of the station has been in the "public interest." See WARNER,
RADIO AND TELEvISIoN LAW § 12 g (1948); Note, 59 YAiE L.. 759, 762 (1950).
Communications Act of 1934, 48 STAT'. 1086, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 312 (1952),
gives the FCC power to revoke a station's license. This power has led to almost docile
compliance by the industry with commission orders. Letter from Lionel Wernick,
business manager in charge of television, station WCAU, to the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review, March 15, 1957, on file in Biddle Law Library.
27. For an evocative account of the inner workings of the FCC, see Drew Pearson,
Philadelphia Bulletin, Feb. 5, 1957, p. 66, col. 7.
28. See note 4 supra. Two commissioners abstained from the instant decision for
the same reasons as were given for the November 1 refusal. 14 Piu & FiscHm RADIO
REG. 720 (1956) (letter to Frank Stanton, President of CBS).
29. See text and citations at notes 25-27 supra.
30. Letter from Charles Vanda, vice president in charge of television, station
WCAU, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Feb. 15, 1957, on file in
Biddle Law Library. See Hearings, supra note 13, at 199 (statement of Mr. Richard
Salant, vice-president of CBS) : "This is one of those things where if you are wrong
on the law you can go out of business, and that is a big risk. . . . [T]he only time
we can appeal that [commission ruling] is when we have ignored their ruling and
lost our license. This is too much of a risk to take. Who can guess what the Supreme
Court is going to say?" See also FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946).
But see Note, 61 YALE LJ. 87, 94 (1952).
1. The agreement was entitled "Purchase Money Security Agreement." It stipu-
lated that buyer was to pay the price of the goods in twelve monthly installments after
delivery by seller, seller reserving "title... and. . .a security interest in the property"
until the final payment was made.
2. PA. ST'A'r. ANN. tit. 12A (Purdon 1954) (hereinafter cited as UCC). Penn-
sylvania is, to date, the only state to adopt the code, approving it April 6, 1953, effective
July 1, 1954.
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including the "right to enter judgment for the full amount of the purchase
price then unpaid."83 The agreement, a printed form prepared by seller,
further stated that delivery was to be made at buyer's place of business,
though no date was specified, 4 and that seller had the right to "cancel" at
any time before delivery. Prior to delivery buyer notified seller that he
wished to repudiate the agreement, whereupon seller entered judgment
for the full amount of the purchase price 5 Buyer petitioned the court to
open judgment, alleging that entry of judgment was contrary to the pro-
visions of the Uniform Commercial Code.6 The petition was granted on
the ground that entry of judgment for the full amount of the purchase
price, without a showing of what goods, if any, had been identified to the
contract, and what goods were specially manufactured and not resaleable,
7
"would be in effect 'unreasonably large liquidated damages' and, therefore,
unconscionable and void" under section 2-718 of the code.8 Denkin v.
Sterner, 70 York Leg. Rec. 105 (York County, Pa. C.P. July 16, 1956).
Under the common law,9 the Sale of Goods Act 10 and the Uniform
Sales Act,"x the general rule, with certain exceptions,12 was that a seller
3. See PA. STATr. ANxN. tit. 12, §§ 738, 739 (Purdon 1953), authorizing entry of
judgment by confession. For a discussion of Pennsylvania procedure with regard to
entry of judgment by confession, see 2 ANDRSON, P4NNSYLVANIA CIVIL PRACTIC"
245-47 (1950) ; 4 id. at 2-9. The instant agreement also gave seller the right to enter
judgment in replevin immediately should the buyer default.
4. UCC § 2-309(1) states: "The time for. . .delivery. .. if not provided in this
Article or agreed upon shall be a reasonable time." UCC § 1-204(2) states that a
"reasonable time" depends on "the nature, purpose and circumstances of such action."
5. Nowhere in the agreement did it clearly appear that the right to enter judgment
was to accrue upon an anticipatory repudiation of the agreement by buyer.
6. Buyer also urged the agreement was void for want of mutuality in view of
seller's right to "cancel" at any time prior to delivery. Brief for Defendant, p. 2. Seller
replied that the word "cancel" must be interpreted in the light of UCC § 2-106(4),
which defines "cancellation" as occurring when "either party puts an end to the con-
tract for breach by the other." Brief for Plaintiff, p. 6. The court made no ruling on
this point. Instant case at 106.
7. See UCC § 2-709(1) (b). UCC § 2-709(1) (a), enabling seller to recover the
price if the buyer has "accepted" the goods or if the goods have been lost or damaged
after risk of their loss has passed to buyer, is inapplicable in the instant case, for there
was no "acceptance" of the goods within the meaning of UCC § 2-606. It should be
noted, however, that repudiation exposed buyer to risk. UCC § 2-510.
8. UCC § 2-718(1): "Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in
the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated
or actual hardi caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the incon-
venience or non-feasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing
unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty."
9. Atkinson v. Bell, 8 B. & C. 277, 108 Eng. Rep. 1046 (K.B. 1828) ; Elliott v.
Pybus, 10 Bing. 512, 131 Eng. Rep. 993 (C.P. 1834). See Williston, The Right of a
Seller of Goods To Recover the Price, 20 HARV. L. REv. 363 (1907).
10. 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, § 49(1) (1893) (hereinafter cited as SALt or GoODs AcT).
The act also permitted an action for the price where "the price is payable on a day
certain irrespective of delivery, and the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay
such price." Id. § 49(2). This section and its applicability to a conditional sale contract
are discussed in 3 WiLLIs oN, SAL-eS §§ 575, 579 (rev. ed. 1948).
11. UNIORM SALis AcT § 63(1).
12. Two of the exceptions are relevant here: seller under a conditional sale con-
tract might recover the price if buyer, having possession of the goods, defaulted upon
the contract. SALE or GOoDs Acv § 49(2) ; UNVOR SAI.ms Act § 63(2); UmNvORm
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could recover the purchase price only if title to the goods had passed to
the buyer. Passage of title was determined by the intentions of the parties
or, if necessary, by presumptions.'3 The sales article of the Uniform
Commercial Code 14 presents a new approach: "The legal consequences
[of a contract for the sale of goods] are stated as following directly from the
contract and action taken under it without resorting to the idea of when
property or title passed or was to pass as being the determining factor." '
In the event of buyer's anticipatory repudiation of the contract, seller may
resort to any of his remedies for breach of contract that may be appropri-
ate.1' His primary remedy is resale, buttressed by an action for damages
if resale does not make him whole.17 An action for the price is limited by
section 2-709 to situations where "buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes
due. .. . ," 18 Contractual modification or limitation of the remedies pro-
vided by the code is permitted, 19 subject to the provision dealing with
liquidated damages and subject also to the court's broad power under sec-
CONDrIONAL SALES AcT § 3; 3 Wn.LISTON, SALES §§ 560b, 571, 575, 579 (rev. ed.
1948). In the event of an anticipatory repudiation of the contract by buyer, seller
might recover the price where goods being specially manufactured for the buyer and
without other market value were close to completion at the time of the repudiation.
E.g., Lannom Mfg. Co. v. Strauss Co., 235 Iowa 97, 15 N.W.2d 899 (1944) ; see Note,
Measure of Damages for Anticipatory Breach of a Contract of Sale, 24 COLUm. L.
Rnv. 55 (1924) ; Comment, 47 MIcH. L. Rev. 538 (1949). See also UxIvoRm SALES
AcT § 63(3) ; 3 Wiaisrox, SAsS §§ 573, 587 (rev. ed. 1948). Some courts have per-
mitted a recovery of the price in the event of an anticipatory repudiation of the
contract if the contract contained a reasonably definite no-cancellation clause. See Note,
Seller's Recovery When Buyer Repudiates Before Completion of Manufacture, 99 U.
PA. L. Rzv. 229, 237-40 (1950) and cases cited therein.
13. See SALE op GoODs AcT § 18; UNIORM SALES AcT § 19; 2 WILUsToN, SALEs
9§ 263-79a (rev. ed. 1948).
14. For discussion and criticism of the sales article generally, see Corbin, The
Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.Z . 821 (1950);
Hall, Article 2--Sales---"From Status to Contract"?, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 209; Rabel,
The Sales Law in the Proposed Commercial Code, 17 U. CHi. L. REV. 427 (1950);
Waite, The Proposed New Uniform Sales Act, 48 MIcH. L. REv. 603 (1950) ; Willis-
ton, The Law of Sales it the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARv. L. REv.
561 (1950). Also helpful in understanding the sales article is Llewellyn, Through Title
to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U.L.Q. Riv. 159 (1938).
15. UCC § 2-101, comment.
16. UCC § 2-610. Seller may also "await performance by the repudiating party or
negotiate for retraction, the repudiating party meanwhile being free to retract.. .and in
either case [seller may] suspend his own performance." UCC §§ 2-610(b), (c). Willis-
ton and Hall have criticized this provision as likely to increase damages unnecessarily
in some cases. Williston, supra note 14, at 584; Hall, supra note 14, at 223.
17. UCC §§ 2-706, 2-708, 2-710.
18. Seller may recover ". . .the price (a) of goods accepted or of conform-
ing goods lost or damaged after risk of their loss has passed to buyer; and (b) of
goods identified to the contract if the seller is unable after reasonable effort to
resell them at a reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably indicate that such an
effort will be unavailing." UCC § 2-709.
19. UCC § 2-719: "(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of
this section and of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages, (a)
the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those
provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable
under this Article . ... "
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tion 2-302 to refuse to enforce unconscionable clauses or contracts.30
Liquidated damages clauses are permitted by section 2-718(1), if reason-
able.2 1 Reasonableness is to be determined "in the light of the anticipated
or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and
the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate
remedy." 2
In seeking to obtain the price of the goods without bringing an action
under section 2-709, seller claimed to be exercising his right to modify
his remedies by contract23 Since modification of remedies is subject to
section 2-718,24 in testing the validity of the modification it becomes neces-
sary to determine whether this particular modification-confession of
judgment for the price-was a provision for liquidation of damages. If
seller was to retain the goods even after satisfaction of the judgment, then
the amount of the judgment would constitute damages and the test of
"reasonableness" under section 2-718 would have to be met. If, on the
other hand, buyer was to have a right to the goods upon satisfaction of
20. UCC § 2-302: "(1) If the court finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to be unconscionable it may refuse to enforce the contract or may strike any uncon-
scionable clauses and enforce the contract as if the stricken clause had never existed.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof
may be unconscionable the court may afford the parties an opportunity to present
evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the
determination." See Note, Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code: The Con-
sequences of Unconscionability in Sales Contracts, 63 Y= L.J. 560 (1954) ; Legislative
Note, Definition and Interpretation of Unconscionable Contracts, 58 Dicm. L. REv. 161
(1954).
21. See note 8 supra.
22. Ibid.
23. Brief for Plaintiff, p. 4. Confession of judgment is a significant modification
of UCC § 2-709. Were seller not to rely on confession of judgment, in order to
recover the purchase price he would have to show that he had identified the goods to
the contract and either that he had failed after making a reasonable effort to resell
them or that reasonable commercial judgment indicated resale effort would be unavail-
ing. See note 18 supra. Seller acted as a middleman between buyer and manufacturer
in the instant case, accepting buyer's order and in turn ordering from manufacturer. At
the time of the repudiation, seller had already ordered from manufacturer, but it is
unclear whether this order had yet been filled. However, UCC § 2-704 permits an ag-
grieved seller to complete the processs of procurement or manufacture after he learns
of buyer's breach, and to identify the goods to the contract "unless in reasonable com-
mercial judgment the completion will materially increase the damages." Comment 2
to this section adds that the burden shall be on the buyer "to show the commercially
unreasonable nature of the seller's action in completing manufacture." Ordinarily, then,
seller may rest on his allegation that damages were not increased by completing the
procurement process. To permit confession of judgment would be to permit buyer to
"agree' in advance not to contest this allegation. Though this is itself a modification of
the remedies provided by the code, it is probably not a significant one. A different
situation pertains, however, with respect to the non-resaleability of the goods. Though
§ 2-709 in which this requirement is found makes no mention of the burden of proof,
the burden rests by implication on seller. Since an action for the price is not his
primary remedy, but rather resale and an action for damages, the seller would seem to
be required by the code to come forward to show that he is entitled to more. To sus-
tain confession of judgment would be to hold that the parties by agreement could re-
lieve the seller of this burden.
24. See note 19 supra.
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the judgment, seller would have received not damages but, in effect, specific
performance. In this event the confession of judgment clause would re-
quire scrutiny in the light of section 2-302.2 The crucial issue in the
instant case is, therefore, which party had a right to the goods upon satis-
faction of the judgment. The agreement itself affords no solution. Had
seller brought an action under section 2-709, he would have been re-
quired by that section to hold the goods for buyer,26 but, having modified his
remedy for the price, it is not clear whether seller remains under the
same obligation. The code provides no guidance. The court could have
adopted the position that, as a matter of law, if a seller seeks the price
he holds the goods for the buyer,27 or the court might have treated the mod-
ification as a liquidation of damages since the agreement made no mention
of any right of buyer to the goods after satisfaction of the judgment. The
latter construction seems the sounder, for it resolves the ambiguity arising
from the silence of the agreement against the party that drafted it-in
this case the seller. In such case, recovery of the price would clearly be
unreasonable as not in consonance with the anticipated or actual harm
arising from the repudiation.
2 8
Should the court have considered that seller must hold the goods for
buyer, section 2-302 becomes applicable. Although the courts have as yet
developed no standards for conscionability under section 2-302, a suggested
standard where seller seeks the price through a modification of section 2-709
is that which a court of equity would apply in determining whether to grant
specific performance 9 Were the judgment to stand, the seller could, of
course, immediately execute upon it. Though buyer would have a right
to the goods upon satisfaction of the judgment, there would be attendant
risks. Seller may not have yet secured the goods from the manufacturer.
Seller's creditors may have meanwhile acquired liens on the goods or might
otherwise intervene to the detriment of buyer. The goods might not comply
25. See note 20 supra.
26. UCC § 2-709(2) : "Where the seller sues for the price he must hold for the
buyer any goods which have been identified to the contract and are still in his control
except that if resale becomes possible he may resell them at any time prior to the
collection of the judgment. The net proceeds of any such resale must be credited to
the buyer and payment of the judgment entitles him to any goods not resold."
27. Cf. ibid.
28. Only in the event the goods were specially manufactured and without resale
value might such an amount be reasonable, and the burden should be on seller to show
that they are of such a nature.
29. Cf. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948) (specific per-
formance refused where contract, drafted by complainant, was oppressive). An objec-
tion has been raised to an action for the price as a remedy for anticipatory repudiation
on the ground that, since this action is essentially one for specific performance, it gives
seller a remedy not reciprocally available to buyer. Waite, The Seller's Action for the
Price, 17 MIcH. L. Riv. 283, 293 (1919). Aside from the question of symmetry in the
law, it should be noted that the code provides buyer with a right of specific per-
formance in certain cases. UCC § 2-716. See also Williston, The Right of the Seller of
Goods To Recover the Price, 20 HARv. L. REv. 363 (1907).
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with the terms of the agreement. 30  Moreover, to countenance confession
of judgment in this case would lead to an economically irrational result.
The goods, if they have any resale value whatever, would be placed in the
hands of one perhaps not able to use them or easily resell them. Seller, on
the other hand, if forced to keep the goods, would have a sales force with
experience in finding outlets for this type of equipment.31 These considera-
tions indicate that confession of judgment for the purchase price, as a modi-
fication of an action for the price under 2-709, would be unconscionable when
applied to an anticipatory repudiation. Were the court not to find the mod-
ification unconscionable per se, it might still refuse to enforce the modifica-
tion if it found the agreement as a whole oppressive. The instant agree-
ment, drafted by seller, was strongly one-sided. Fifteen of its sixteen
clauses imposed duties on buyer or granted rights to seller, who, in effect,
was obligated only to sell and possibly not even that since he was to be
able to cancel at any time before delivery. Accordingly, the clause was
properly not enforced in the instant case.
3 2
If correctly drafted, a clause permitting confession of judgment for the
price need not be unenforceable. Aside from the objection that the agree-
ment as a whole was oppressive, which could be cured by temperance in
drafting, the difficulty in the modification in the instant case was three-
fold: the clause was not plainly applicable to an anticipatory repudia-
tion, raising a preliminary problem of interpretation; the buyer had no
clear right to the goods upon satisfaction of the judgment; even assum-
ing he had such a right, buyer was forced to undertake a substantial risk
30. Were seller suing buyer for the price under UCC § 2-709, the goods would
have to have been identified to the contract and seller would then have to hold them for
buyer under § 2-709(2). Under the SALi op GooDs AcT § 49(2) and the UNIoRm
SALES AcT § 63(2), it was possible for the seller to maintain an action for the price if
the parties had agreed that the buyer was to pay the seller in advance of delivery and
buyer had wrongfully failed to do so. It was a defense to such an action, however, that"seller at any time before judgment ... [had] manifested an inability to perform the
contract or the sale on his part or an intention not to perform it." UnVoaR SA14s AcT
§ 63(2). Under the code the seller may no longer maintain an action for the price for
failure of buyer to make an agreed-upon advance. See UCC § 2-709, comment 4.
Moreover, if the buyer does make an agreed-upon advance he acquires a security interest
in the goods. UCC § 9-204(6). Under UCC § 2-609, when reasonable grounds for
insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party, the other may demand
adequate assurance of due performance. Failure to provide such assurance is a repudia-
tion of the contract. These proirisions of the code suggest a strong policy against
exposing buyers to the risk of paying the price when the goods may not be forthcoming.
31. Such a consideration is suggested by Honnold, among others. HONNOLD, LAW
OP SALS AND SALEVS FINANCiNG 213 (1954). He raises doubts, however, as to the
admiuistrability of a rule which turns on the existence of a sales force. This need not
be a serious problem if the question of who is better able to resell is viewed as but a
factor, probably not a decisive one when standing alone, in aiding the court to determine
whether a given modificationof the seller's remedy is proper.
32. The instant court was willing to enforce the contract minus the clause found
oppressive. For a discussion of the propriety of enforcing a contract minus a clause
without which the agreement is meaningless, see Note, Section 2-302 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: The Consequences of Unconscionability in Sales Contracts, 63
YALE L.J. 560, 564-66 (1954).
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of not recovering them. The first two of these difficulties could be met
by specific statements in the agreement that the seller is to have the
right to enter judgment by confession in the event of buyer's anticipatory
repudiation and that buyer has a right to the goods upon satisfaction of
the judgment. The third objection could be removed by requiring that,
as a condition to satisfaction of the judgment, seller must tender the goods.
